The „Modes" of Spinoza and the „Monads" of Leibniz.

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„Leibniz's philosophy is a metaphysic, and, in sharp opposition to the simple universal Substance of Spinoza, where all that is determined is merely transitory, it makes fundamental the absolute multiplicity of individual substances." The contrast which Hegel[1]) here institutes between the systems of thought whose relations to one another in some aspects I propose in this paper to consider has become familiar enough in more recent expositions, and I do not deny that it has a certain measure of justification. I believe, however, the antithesis suggested is far more pronounced than any which a careful comparison of the philosophical conceptions in question will reveal, and that, notwithstanding the antagonistic positions from which they start, the results reached and the difficulties encountered by the two thinkers present a surprising amount of similarity. „Spinoza would be right", Leibniz once observed, „if there were no monads", and he meant, no doubt, to imply that the theory of monads had entirely altered the philosophical outlook. I shall try to show that as a matter of fact it did not. But let it not be supposed, on that account, that I am wishful to disparage the work of Leibniz. To most of the branches of philosophy he made contributions of real value and importance, and these retain their significance even though his solution of ultimate metaphysical problems turns out to be one of the numerous ways in which they cannot be solved.

In this connexion another remark may be permissible. Mr. Russell has made himself responsible for the dictum that „monism must be pantheistic and monadism must be atheistic[2])"; and he appears to think that a coherent philosophy might emerge from the labour of Leibniz, if from it there were pruned away the inconsistencies due to the retention of the idea of God. This is a view which more than one writer has countenanced, and I am not at present concerned to ask how far it could resist criticism. One thing, however, is certain. A monadism of that sort would have no affinity with Leibniz's monadism. He would have recognised in it little that was distinguishable from the atomism in opposition to which his speculative reflexion was one sustained polemic. The notion of God, as the ultimate ground of things, was no excrescence on Leibniz's system, nor did it play the part there of that convenient receptacle for the difficulties of thought, — the unknown and the unknowable. On the contrary, it was intimately related to well-nigh every one of the general considerations which he brought to bear in his interpretation of the world and human life.

It is, of course, impossible in one paper to do more than indicate in a summary manner the lines of consideration along which, as it seems to me, the two systems may be profitably compared with one another. If, in thus dealing summarily with great conceptions, I seem unsympathetic or even unfair, I plead the exigencies of a limited undertaking; and protect myself by pointing out that judiciously balanced statements of the philosophies of both thinkers exist already in abundance.

I am well aware, for instance, that two opposing ways of regarding substance are struggling for mastery in the Ethics, and that to do full justice to

1) *Werke*, Bd. XV., p. 408.

2) Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, pp. 172 and 185.

Spinoza one would have do take both these tendencies into account. I shall, indeed, have something to say about them later on. But in a short essay it is legitimate to lay stress upon what appears to be the actual effect of his reasoning rather than upon its effect as he himself was sometimes inclined to conceive it. To avoid misunderstanding, however, it is perhaps necessary to state, without attempting to defend, the view I should take upon one or two matters of disputed interpretation. In the first place, it seems to me clear that the guiding principle of Spinoza's philosophical method is the principle of ground and consequent, and that what he calls causation is identical with this relation. It is, so I understand him to mean, only when things are viewed from the standpoint of the imagination that they are conceived as connected in some other manner than that of logical sequence. From the point of view of reason, it is seen that if anothing is a cause its effect must necessarily be deducible from it, must follow from it „by the same necessity as it follows from the nature of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles". Substance, therefore, is not for him a producing cause of the universe, or even of finite things, but the ground or reason thereof, that on which all else must depend, as the conclusion of a syllogism depends upon the premisses. In the second place, I cannot, largely on account of what I have just been saying, accept the representation of those expositors who take Spinoza to mean by „Attributes" lines of force or energy, lying at the basis of the divine activity. The doctrine of „Attributes" is notoriously a difficult doctrine even from the point of view of mere exegesis, but I find it wholly impossible to suppose that Spinoza, at least in the *Ethics*, intended to postulate a number of real powers or potencies, each existing in and for itself, whatever he may have done when he was more immediately under the influence of Cartesianism. That would have been palpably to contradict *ab initio* the very thesis he was setting out to establish. How could a multiplicity of modes of energy each be infinite *in suo genere?* Admittedly, there is nothing in the definition of „Attribute" to support this interpretation. Spinoza I take to be defining „Attribute" as a way in which substance is apprehended. At the same time, I do not think it is implied that the content of such apprehension is subjective in character. To our apprehension, it is true, substance can present only some of its features, some of its essence, but so far as what is apprehended is concerned, no distinction is to be drawn between the content cognised and the real essence. Strongly as he emphasises the distinction between partial and complete knowledge, Spinoza recognises no antithesis between what is truly known and what is.

So much, then, by way of preface. I proceed now at once to the special themes I purpose to discuss. I propose to consider the sense in which particular things are regarded by the two thinkers as existing, the mode of being ascribed to them, the different stages of development they are thought to exhibit, and the relation in which they are conceived to stand to the ultimate ground.

I. Esse essentiae and esse existentiae. A long and intricate chapter in the history of thought remains to be written upon the transformations in meaning undergone by the term „substance" prior to its adoption by the Cartesians. Professor Pringle-Pattison is certainly justified in emphasising the fundamental difference between the Aristotelian conception of πρώτη οὐσία and the conception of substance as the self-subsistent[1]). It is worth while, however, reminding ourselves that Aristotle's use of οὐσία is by no means uniform, and that the prototype of the latter conception is also to be found in the *Metaphysic.*

[1]) The Idea of God, p. 272.

After defining οὐσία as that to which being (τὸ εἶναι) in the strict sense belongs (*Meta.*, 1028, a 31), Aristotle does, no doubt, usually interpret this to mean „that which cannot stand in a judgment as predicate or attribute of anything else". The distinctive mark of a substance then consists in the fact of its being a τόδε τι, a single individual thing with a determinate nature (τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον). It is not, indeed, the content apprehended by sense at any given moment; it is the individual entity which trough all its changes preserves its indestructible form or essence and which can only be truly known by grasping the form or essence which characterises it. All the same, it does not consist of essence or form (εἶδος) merely; it is always an οὐσία σύνθετος, that is to say, the essence or type as realised under conditions peculiar to each individual, conditions which can be summarily expressed by the term matter (ὕλη). Matter is equivalent, in short, to the totality of conditions by which each individual concrete thing (σύνολον) is determined as a unique existent and as finite. Yet, while insisting that in the world of genesis only the concrete individual thing is substance, Aristotle is constrained (in Book xii of the *Metaphysic*) to the admission that there must be an eternal unmovable substance (ὅτι ἀνάγκη εἶναι τινα ἀΐδιον οὐσίαν ἀκίνητον), because otherwise the universe would be destructible. And this eternal unmovable substance he takes to be pure essence without matter, and to be complete reality (τὸ δὲ τί ἦν εἶναι οὐκ ἔχει ὕλην τὸ πρῶτον . ἐντελέχεια γάρ). In other words, the divine being, as a self-dependent, eternally complete and unchangeable essence, is an individual substance, and hence an individual existent, but in a sense totally different from that in which concrete individual things had been defined to be substances and existents. To put it briefly, Aristotle is virtually saying that God is *causa sui* whose essence involves existence, whereas in the case of finite things their essence never does involve their existence. And the irresolvable problem created by these two incompatible positions would be one way of exhibiting the incoherent character of Aristotle's speculative system. Aristotle, it is true, conceived of God as standing outside the whole process which, by his mere presence, he initiates in nature. But the fact that precisely the same irresolvable problem reappears in the speculation of Spinoza should be sufficient to show that the substitution of the notion of immanence for the notion of transcendence affords in itself no safeguard against the danger which so constantly besets metaphysical construction, — the danger, namely, of finding ourselves stranded with two worlds which persistently fall apart and resist any possibility of rational connexion.

From the commencement of his literary activity Spinoza had resigned himself to admitting a two-fold significance of the term „existence". In the *Cogitata Metaphysica* he defines being (ens) as „all that which, when clearly and distinctly apprehended, is found to exist necessarily, or at least to be capable of existing", and proceeds to the assertion that being may be divided into (a) being which in virtue of its own nature exists necessarily, or the essence of which involves only a possible existence, and (b) being the essence of which involves only a possible existence, indicating, at the same time, that this is equivalent to a division of being into substance and mode, not into that of substance and accident (i. 1). Then, in regard to modes, he goes on to explain that *esse essentiae* is „nothing else than the way in which created things are comprehended in the Attributes of God" while *esse existentiae* is „the essence of things considered apart from God *(extra Deum)* and in itself", seeing that „it is attributed to things after they have been created by God" (i. 2, § 3). Later on, in a chapter on the eternity of God, he contends that eternity is not to be conceived as indefinite duration. God's being is eternal in the sense of timelessness; in it *nihil prius nec*

posterius dari potest. Duration is *affectio existentiae, non vero essentiae rerum.* No one would say that the essence of a circle or of a triangle, in so far it is an eternal truth, has endured for a longer period than from the time of Adam. A created thing can be said to possess existence, because certainly existence does not belong to its essence; but God cannot be said to possess existence, for the existence of God is God himself. Consequently, while created things may be said to possess duration, God can in no wise be said to possess it[1]). Writing to Meyer, about the time of the publication of the *Cogitata,* Spinoza urges that of the existence of substance we conceive in a totally different manner from that in which we conceive of the existence of modes. Hence arises recognition of the distinction between eternity and duration, for we can explain a certain measure of the existence of modes in terms of duration, but we can only explain the existence of substance in terms of eternity, in terms of the infinite enjoyment of existence or essence (*Ep.* xii, Vloten and Land's ed.). In the *Short Treatise,* the identity of God's existence and essence is laid down at the outset as fundamental. On the other hand, it is asserted that while „the essences of things are from all eternity and will remain to all eternity unalterable", yet as existences particular things are constantly changing. And in several places it is certainly implied that, although the essences of all things are included in God, the existences taken on by particular things are not in like manner included therein. A similar line is followed in the *Ethics.* „The existence of God and His essence are one and the same" (i. 20). „The essence of things produced by God does not involve existence." Consideration of that essence, whether existing or non-existing, discloses that it neither involves existence nor duration. It cannot therefore, be the cause or ground either of the existence of things or of their duration (i. 24). Essence and existence, that is to say, are to be distinguished as two different forms of being which in the case of God and the Attributes are in harmony with one another, even identical with one another, in the case of the infinite modes are in harmony with one another but not identical, while in the case of the finite modes they evince themselves as throughout in disharmony. Accordingly, it is contended that the being of substance does not pertain to the essence, does not constitute the form, of a man (or of any finite mode), because then the existence of the latter would follow from the existence of the former, which would imply the absurdity of its being necessary existence (ii. 10). Finally, attention may be drawn in this connexion to the proposition (v. 23) that „the human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, but something of it remains which is eternal". What remains is the essence; as timeless, it cannot be affected by death, which is merely a change in the series of changes; death affects only temporal existence. We feel that our mind, in so far, that is, as it is *mentis essentia,* is eternal. On the other hand, only in so far as it involves the actual existence of the body can the mind be said to posses duration, in other words, existence limited by a fixed time.

These passages, which might easily be added to, will suffice to bring out the kind of conception with which Spinoza is proceeding. He is trying to work together two ways of regarding the universe of particular things. It appertains to the nature of a finite mode, on the one hand, that it possesses an individual existence, a particular and determinate being, distinct from the being of substance as the ground of this determinate being, distinct, also, from other determinate beings; and, on the other hand, that it is yet substance itself in a determinate

[1]) A follower of Bergson might argue that in strictness the analogy required it to be maintained that God cannot be said to possess duration, because God is duration. But that, of course, is just what Spinoza denies.

condition, and in so far again one with the whole complex of other modes, so that things are not *realiter* but only *modaliter* separate from one another (*Eth.* i, 15 Schol.). Hence it is that a mode is described as „God *in so far as* He is modified in a determinate modification", or „*in so far as* God is affected in a certain manner" (*e. g., Eth.* i, 28); hence it is that an idea is spoken of as „God *in so far as* God is considered as affected by an idea" (*e. g., Eth.* ii, 9), or that the human mind is spoken of as „God having such an idea *in so far as* God forms the essence of the human mind" (*e. g., Eth.* ii, 11). The observation has often been made that the full stress of Spinoza's problem comes to a head in the use he makes of this relative particle *quatenus.* (*a*) In so far as „all things are in God", each particular mode is *in a sense* eternal and infinite. As an „affection" of substance, even its continuance in existence is dependent upon substance and its essence considered simply as contained in the whole modal system or *natura naturata* involves its existence. But this „existence" is not temporal existence, not duration, not existence „abstractly conceived" (*Eth.* ii, 45); it is the timeless being which the mode possesses as following from the necessity of God's nature; and we are not entitled to assume that, in the being of God, the mode stands out as a *res singularis.* (*b*) In so far as things have a distinctive nature of their own, each particular mode exhibits characteristics which cannot be traced back to its dependence upon substance. „That which is finite and which has a determinate existence cannot be produced by the absolute nature of any Attribute of God, for whatever follows from the absolute nature of any attribute of God is infinite and eternal" (i. 28). Thus „determinate existence", or the existence of modes in the *communis ordo naturae*, and the „existence" which modes may be said to possess in virtue of their essence in the Attributes of God, — that is, as constituting *natura naturata*[1]. — these are not only different but fundamentally antagonistic.

The insuperable difficulties which are thus occasioned for Spinoza's metaphysical theory come to light at well-nigh every turning-point of its development. So far as necessary „existence" is concerned, it is, for example, clear that the demonstration offered of the proposition that it pertains to the nature of substance to exist (*Eth.* i, 7) is a *petitio principii.* Substance, according to the definition, is „that the conception of which does not require the conception of another thing". But, in that case, so the proof runs, it can have no cause outside of itself, for „the knowledge of an effect depends upon and involves the knowledge of the cause". And as substance can have no cause outside of itself, it must be *causa sui*; existence, therefore, must pertain to its nature. The argument, however, assumes just that which it purports to establish. For if substance has no cause outside itself, it follows that it must have an inner cause *only* on the assumption that it *is* existent, and that such existence needs a cause, in accordance, indeed, with the dictum laid down in the Scholium of the next proposition, that „of any existing thing there must necessarily be some cause on account of which it exists". In the immediate sequel, Spinoza appears, in fact, tacitly to allow that, by his proof, he has made no advance, for he proceeds to base the self-existence of substance upon the bare definition (substance is „that which is in itself and is conceived through itself"), and to maintain that he who has a clear and distinct idea of substance and yet doubts whether substance exists, is in the predicament of the man who says he has a true idea, but doubts whether or no it is false. And later on still (*Eth.* i, 20) it is definitely laid down that the existence and the es-

[1]) Spinoza does not retain in the *Ethics* the distinction he had made in the *Short Treatise* between *natura naturata generalis and natura naturata particularis*, and I am following Mr. Joachim's interpretation of *natura naturata* in the *Ethics*. (See *Ethics of Spinoza*, pp. 119 *sqq.*)

sence of God are one and the same, from which follows that God's existence is an eternal truth so far as determinate existence is concerned, Spinoza's embarrassment is no less manifest. Particular things, as they appear in the *communis ordo naturae*, cannot be regarded as following of necessity from the nature of substance; their existence as such is transitory and limited; the occurence of any particular thing or event here and now can only be traced backwards from one limited thing or event to another in a chain to which there is no terminus (*Eth.* i, 28). This chain of limited things is, that is to say, somehow in possession of that which can confer upon an essence what it cannot derive from infinite substance. It is true an attempt is made to save the situation by means of the consideration that each of the causes in such a chain is „God or one of God's Attributes, in so far as it is modified by a modification which is finite and has a determinate existence". But, here again, there is obviously being taken for granted the very thing, and, in this context, the only thing, that requires explanation. The question is, how it is possible that existence which is not identical with essence can arise in substance whose existence is idendical with essence. To reply that it arises in so far as substance is already infected by an endless series of existences of the precise type about which we are inquiring, is but to ignore the problem and not to solve it. We are left, as Mr. Joachim expresses it, with a world of determinate existences standing over against the world of essences; somehow certain of the essences or potentialities of things have stepped into the actualities of the world of temporal existence; and, although they have thus become less real than those which remain *in posse* as mere essences, they have yet acquired a distinctness and an individuality and a power of activity, of which, as mere essences, they were destitute[1]).

Turning now to Leibniz's way of handling the problem we have had before us, our object will be to discover whether the theory of monads enables him to avoid the *impasse* just indicated. Leibniz repudiates emphatically enough „the view of Spinoza and of other similar authors, who will have it that there is only one substance,namely God, who thinks, believes and wills one thing in me, but who thinks, believes and wills quite the opposite in some one else" (Gerhardt, vi, p. 537). He reverts to the Aristotelian definition of substance as that which can only be the subject of a proposition and never a predicate. But this definition, he contends, is not sufficient, and is in itself merely verbal. Every true predication must have a basis in the nature of things, and even when the predicate is not explicitly contained in the subject, it is still necessary that it should be implicitly contained in it. The content, then, of the subject must always include that of the predicate in such a way that, if one unterstood perfectly the subject-concept, one would know that the predicate necessarily belongs to it. The concept, therefore, of any individual substance includes once for all everything which can ever happen to that subject; and in contemplating this concept, a perfect intelligence would be able to discern whatsoever can be truly said about such individual, just as in the nature of a circle it would be able to discern all the properties which can be derived therefrom. Each monad is, in this respect, a substance, and in so far an entire world, or a mirror of the whole world which it represents in its own fashion. „The universe is in a manner multiplied as many times as there are substances." Thus, it may, in a sense, be said that just as Spinoza had maintained that everything can be deduced from the one substance, so Leibniz maintains that everything is deducible from the notion of any one of the multitude of substances. So far the contrast between the two

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[1]) *Cf.* Joachim, *op. cit.*, pp. 224—5.

ways of thinking seems to be a marked and decided contrast, although even here it is, I think, more apparent than real. His next step, however, brings Leibniz back, almost at a bound, to the standpoint of Spinoza. For he is constrained to introduce the all-important distinction between primary or original substance and derivative or created substances; and, in so doing, accepts, without recognising the significance of the acceptance, the doctrine of a two-fold mode of existence. The ultimate ground of things must, he argues, be a necessary substance, in which the variety of particular changes exists only „eminently" as its source; and this supreme substance, unique and universal as it is, nothing being independent of it, must be illimitable and contain as much reality as is possible (*Monad.*, §§ 38 and 40). Derivative substances, on the other hand, are contingent entities, dependent upon the ultimate ground just as their own states are dependent upon themselves, essentially limited in character, their limitation constituting in one sense their individuality[1]) (*Ibid.*, § 42).

Here, then, we see the water trickling in that is destined to overflow the house. Since the ground of any existing being can only be sought in an existing being, there must, it is contended, be one being which has metaphysical necessity, and whose essence is identical with existence. In other words, there must exist a being bearing in itself the reason of its own existence, and different from that plurality of beings, the world, which has no metaphysical necessity. If, now, it can be shown that such a being is possible, — that is to say, is not self-contradictory, — we are entitled to affirm its existence, because, since the essence of anything constitutes its possibility, it follows that to exist by its essence is the same as to exist by its possibility. And that the being of God is possible can, Leibniz thinks, be conclusively shown. For God is by definition pure affirmation, absolute perfection, without limit or negations; there can, therefore, be no contradiction involved in the notion of his being. Accordingly, for Leibniz just as for Spinoza, a radical difference of kind is to be constituted between existence in an absolute sense and existence in a relative sense. The essence of an infinite being involves its existence because it is unlimited, because there is nothing to hinder that need of existence (*exigentiam existentiae*), or that tendency to exist, which all essence, as he curiously puts it, carries with it. It is, in fact, the prerogative of the divine nature to have need only of a possibility or an essence in order actually to exist, and this is precisely what is meant by *ens a se*. The essence of a finite being, on the other hand, does not involve its existence, because such essence is limited by other essences; and only by adaptation to other essences, so as to form along with them the best possible world, does it involve even the possibility of existence.

In the case, therefore, of the dependent monads, existence implies, in Leibniz's view, something over and above essence. The position may be briefly formulated thus: —

$$\text{Possibility} + \text{a supplement, } x, = \text{Actuality.}$$

The supplement is that, whatever it is, which is needful to raise possibility into actuality. What, then, is the nature of this x? Such answer as can be extracted from Leibniz strikes one as singularly ineffective. According to his well known doctrine, there hovered before the understanding of God innumerable images of compossible universes, each of them so ordered in point of detail as to be consistent with certain eternal laws of truth. The monads were called into existence by the divine will, which is to be distinguished from the divine understanding, and which is morally determined by the principle of the choice of the

[1]) *Cf. infra*, pp. 344—5.

best. But how does that account of the matter help us in regard to the vital point we are considering? We need to know what new factor is constituted for God or for the world by this fiat of creation, we need to know what has been added to that world of compossible essences which is now more than a world of images, in order that it should have stepped forth into existence outside the divine mind. The mere empty notion of an act avails us nothing, unless the *x* which has accrued through the act can be indicated. The contention might, I suppose, be advanced that the supplement in question was for Leibniz precisely the element of activity which he regarded as the fundamental factor in existent reality. I do not, however, envy the task of anyone who undertakes to render explicable the manner in which activity can be added to essences. Nor would the contention be in keeping with Leibniz's own statements. He is repeatedly asserting that „in possibility or essence itself there is a certain aspiration to exist", that „essence by itself tends to exist", so that it would appear that activity is already involved in the being of essence. Moreover, the choice of the best is, as Professor Latta puts it, „rather a negative release into existence than a positive creation"[1], for it is pictured as a liberating of the essences in question from the counteracting influences of opposite essences, as a removal of hindrances to their inherent power of development. In some way, through the act of creation, the monads become „windowless".

II. Activity as the Principle of Individuality. „I maintain," says Leibniz, in opposing his own view of substance to that of Locke, „that substances cannot be conceived in their bare essence without any activity, that activity is of the essence of substance in general" (Gerh., v, p. 58). It is a slippery notion, that of activity, and all too easily interpreted in a quasi-psychological fashion, into which fashion, indeed, Leibniz's descriptions of it not infrequently tend to fall. But Leibniz makes, at any rate, the attempt to form a conception of activity as contrasted with a mere picture of it. „By force or power (*puissance*)", he writes, „I do not mean the capacity (*pouvoir*) or mere faculty, which is nothing but a near possibility of acting, and which, being as it were dead, never produces an action without being stimulated from without, but I mean something between the capacity (*pouvoir*) and action, something which includes an effort, an act, an entelechy, for force passes of itself into action, in so far as nothing hinders it" (Gerh., iv, 472). Leibniz's doctrine may be expressed briefly thus. The characteristic feature of every individual substance is unity—a unity which is not conceivable after the manner of a merely presented object. Just as it required more than the notion of extendedness to explain the nature of material fact, so it required more than the notion of being merely an object to explain the nature of an individual substance. We need to call to our aid the very different conception of power or energy, a permanent principle of change and action, in order to give definiteness to the thought of individuals as substantive realities. Not only so; the same line of reflexion enables us to define more explicitly the kind of force which is requisite in order that an individual substance should maintain its numerical identity. It is not a force in any way dependent for its mode of being upon spatial realitions—in other words, it is non-material in character. Moreover, since the unity of an individual real substance must be a unity which connects together the various changes that constitute its states, the activity which is its essential quality must be of a kind that is capable of uniting multiplicity of relations with singleness of being; it must, that is to say, be a one in many, or a many in one. And the

[1]) *Mind*, N.S., vol. viii, 1899, p. 347.

only activity which can fulfil a function of that sort is the activity or force of a soul or mental life. Monads are active *per se*, and in them perception implies representation of the external in the internal, of the compound in the simple, of multiplicity in unity, which again involves appetition, or the tendency to pass from one perfection to another. If, then, the contention of Dillmann[1]) is to be allowed, that „the most important concept of Leibniz's Monadology is the concept of representation", the proviso must be added that representation is not merely perception but also striving tendency, that it is a spontaneous power of development no less than a reflecting mirror of the universe.

But the other side of the shield must be displayed. Think out the notion of activity, Leibniz argues, and it will be seen to involve what at first sight appears to be diametrically opposed to it, namely, passivity. Activity is the way in which an individual manifests its individuality. It is, however, not only in virtue of this positive quality that individuality is constituted; an individual not marked off from others, not negatively characterised as being exclusive, would be a contradiction in terms. Activity which simply flowed forth would give no manifestation of itself, just as little as an elastic force which met with no resistence. Every monad must, then, be at once active and passive; active in order to exist at all, passive in order to exist as distinct from the other members of the universe. Accordingly, passivity in the monad is the element of limitation, of incompleteness, of finitude; and since the position of each monad in the whole system is determined by its degree of finitude, its passivity may be said to be that element which constitutes its relatedness to the other monads. Furthermore, each monad, in so far as it is active, has clear and distinct ideas, and apprehends the true nature of reality; in so far as it is passive, its ideas are obscure and confused, and what is obscure and confused *seems* foreign to it, *seems* other than itself, *seems* to be external and material. Matter, in short, although an essential feature in the life ot the monad, is but the phenomenal appearance of that which in truth is non-material.

In all this, it would look, at first sight, as though we had left the „modes" of Spinoza far behind; but, as a matter of fact, Leibniz has been largely engaged in making explicit what is more or less implicit in the *Ethics*. For Spinoza, no less than for Leibniz, the individuality of determinate existences consists in activity. Already in the *Cogitata* (ii. 6) it had been maintained that the principle of life should be attributed to all things, both corporeal and mental. And by life was to be understood the *vim per quam res in suo esse perseverant*, — a force which, although differently represented in different things, each thing may be said to possess in varying degree. But in the *Ethics* the conception is expanded in significance so that it comes to stand for a measure of self-dependence on the part of particular things.

In the first place, it followed directly from the doctrine of Attributes that all *res particulares* are at once corporeal and ideal in character; regarded from one point of view, they are modes of extension, regarded from another point of view they are modes of consciousness. In fact, were it not for the limitation of our understanding, we might apprehend each particular thing as a mode of any one of the innumerable Attributes which constitute the essence of God. Individual things are all of them *animata*, although in different degrees[2]) (ii. 13). What, therefore, can be said generally concerning the human mind may be said regarding the mind of any other thing. Yet this affords no reason for deny-

[1]) *Neue Darstellung der Leibnizschen Monadenlehre*, p. 304.

[2]) *Cf. Short Treatise* (ii. 22). „There can be nothing in nature of which there is not in the soul of that same thing an idea".

ing that minds or souls differ from one another as their bodies do, and that one contains more reality than another. In other words, the kind of life or soul animating a particular thing will depend upon the number of qualities characterising it, or upon its power of acting or suffering.

In the second place, particular things are modes of God's Attributes which express those Attributes in a definite and determinate way (*certo et determinato modo*). Each thing, that is to say, manifests God's nature or essence in a manner peculiar to itself, and as no other thing manifests it. All things derive their essence, and in one sense their existence, from God; but, apart from the fact that they thus follow from the necessity of the divine nature, they have, in virtue of their relation to a fixed time and place, a certain relative independence or modal distinctness. The difficulty or impossibility of reconciling this contention with the trend of thought pursued in the earlier portions of the *Ethics* is patent enough. But it can hardly be questioned that at this juncture of his reflexion Spinoza does speak as though there belonged to particular things, even though the negative element which he had taken, formerly, to distinguish them from the Absolute be disregarded, a certain individuality which, as contained in God, is still positive, and can be known through God.

This affirmative, self-assertive, factor which the essence of a particular thing appears to involve is what Spinoza calls its *conatus*, its tendency or striving towards preservation[1]). Everything strives to maintain itself in existence, and to resist whatever threatens to encrcoach upon, or destroy, its being. Thus the existence of any individual thing cannot be terminated from within itself; on the contrary, „each thing strives, so far in it lies, to persevere in its own being" (*Eth.* iii, 6). The *conatus* is, in fact, it is now declared, the given or actual essence of the thing itself; and it is, therefore, not conditioned by time; it is independent, that is to say, of the reciprocal determination of one thing by another. An inorganic thing manifests its *conatus* by resisting and repelling whatsoever would tend to alter its condition of motion or rest. A plant has its own way of striving to maintain itself against ill-adapted surroundings, and of using its environment to subserve the continuance of its growth and life. In the animal the *conatus* takes the form of appetite or impulse (*appetitus*), and in that form new scope for its exercise is provided. Finally, the *conatus* in the case of man becomes, or may become, an object of his consciousness; he not only strives to persevere in his own being, but he may be aware of such striving. *Appetitus* assumes the aspect of *cupiditas*. It is true that Spinoza makes the curious reservation that the presence of self-consciousness makes no difference, for „whether a man is conscious of his appetite or no, the appetite still remains one and the same" (*Eth.* iii, App., § 1). But I do not think we are entitled to conclude from this that Spinoza meant to imply that the *conatus* which expresses itself in man is a blind unconscious force, a mere will-to-live which uses man as its instrument, whilst the consciousness of it is but an accident of its operation. As Mr. Duff points out[2]), what Spinoza is saying in the passage just quoted is not that there is no difference between appetite in general and human desire, but that there is no difference between a human appetite and a human desire. And I think Mr. Duff is right in his contention that, according to Spinoza, all human striving is *cupiditas*, whether it be called a *conatus*, an appetite, or a volition, and that of every *cupiditas* a man is, or at least may be conscious.

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1) *Cf.* Leibniz's assertion that force is „that from which activity follows when nothing prevents it; it is effort, *conatus*," *Lettre à M. Pelisson* (1691).

2) *Spinoza's Political and Ethical Philosophy*, p. 78, *sqq.*

The activity, then, upon which Leibniz lays such stress as constituting the essence of individuality was equally recognised by Spinoza; and was, in fact, not less strongly emphasised by him. Whether he regarded it as playing the important part in perceptive experience that Leibniz claims for it is not easy to determine. But, at any rate, he leaves us in no doubt as to its unique position in the higher intellectual life. „Whatever we desire through reason is nothing else than the desire to understand. And since this striving of the mind (*mentis conatus*), by which the mind, in so far as it reasons, endeavours to preserve its being, is nothing but the striving to understand, it follows that this striving to understand (*intelligendi conatus*) is the primary and sole foundation of virtue" (*Eth.* iv, 26).

Equally, too, Spinoza had discovered what seemed to him elements of passivity in the development of individual experience. The various *imaginationes* of vague experience, when the order of their occurrence is not regulated by the conscious subject—so long, that is to say, as the mind perceives things as existing in the *communis ordo naturae,* or, in other words, is determined from without to apprehend this or that— are *passive* in character; and in describing these as fragments, or as torn, mutilated portions of ideas, Spinoza is on the verge of formulating the doctrine that sensations are confused concepts. And one need do no more than refer to the elaborate analysis of the „passive emotions" in the third Book of the *Ethics*, where the notion of passivity carries with it similar implications.

That Spinoza, on the basis of his view of substance, was legitimately entitled to make use of the conception of *conatus*, as the essence of an individual thing, may well,indeed,be doubted. Activity is introduced by him *ex abrupto* and no serious attempt is made to justify its introduction. It is true that we are vaguely told at the beginning (*Eth.* i, 11) that to be able to exist is power (*potentia*); but it is in the descent from the realm of the Unconditioned to the realm of the Conditioned through means of the infinite modes that activity first becomes prominent. The infinite modes, *motus et quies* and *intellectus absolute infinitus*, are just the Attributes of Extension and Thought *plus* the element of activity. But as to how this supplementary factor is supposed to emerge from the undifferentiated wholes of Extension and Thought, Spinoza leaves us in the dark. He seems to be taking the notion of „depending on" as equivalent to that of „following from". Obviously, however, the identification of the two notions is illegitimate. Motion no doubt depends upon extension; but in no sense can it be said to follow from extension. Yet it is evident, I think, that Leibniz too, is in the long run confronted with no less obstinate a difficulty. The transition from the pure undifferentiated activity of God to the myriad finite centres of activity in the created universe is hardly easier to render intelligible than the transition effected by Spinoza.

III. Stages in the Development of Individual Things. It is impossible here to do more than briefly indicate the various stages recognised by Spinoza and Leibniz in the development of particular existences. The notion of evolution was, of course, more deeply imbedded in the speculation of Leibniz than in that of Spinoza. The general principle of continuity was never for long absent from Leibniz's thought. Thought at first formulated by him with reference to the nature of quantitative changes, it was soon extended to the whole range of reality. It led him rapidly to the conclusion that any absolute qualitative difference between one entity and another, such as was involved in the Cartesian antithesis of consciousness and extension, calls to be rejected. If there are to be real individuals, and if these individuals are to be parts of one and the same

system, no differences of kind must be allowed to obtain among them. In its ultimate nature, reality must be continuous. Any amount of difference there might be, provided such difference be difference of degree only. From this to the further determination of the ultimate elements of reality as psychical in character was but a short step for a speculative genius of the subtlety of Leibniz. The step was taken by help of the consideration that an individual being must be conceived as that which unites in itself a manifold, and that in a sphere of mere extendedness a unity of the kind in question was precluded.

The individuals, then, of which the universe consists are mental in nature and distinguishable by differences in the degree of completeness with which the combination of a manifold in unity is represented by them. Taking the human individual as our point of departure, we find on the one hand the lower types of life exhibited in animals and plants, and, on the other hand, we are entitled to contemplate forms of life higher than our own, culminating at length in the life of the supreme Monad. There is one power common to all these individuals, —the power, namely, of representing in various degrees the universe, of mirroring it dack from his own point of view. The mirroring activity up to a certain stage may be called „perception", the process of including the many in a unity; beyond that stage it may be called „apperception", that is to say, perception which has become self-conscious. „Life is a perceptive principle; the soul is sensitive life; mind is rational soul". And what distinguishes one stage of representation from another is just the degree of clearness and distinctness of apprehension. At the one limit dim, obscure, confused perception, at the other full, clear, adequate apperception—between these lie all the stages of psychical development. Naturally, Leibniz's chief obstacles lie at the two extremes of the scale—at the lower, he has to make the leap from the unconscious to the conscious; at the higher, that from imperfect to perfect self-consciousness.

Beginning, then, at the lower end, the principle of continuity has to serve as justification for regarding the unconscious as simply a low degree of the conscious, for regarding unconsciousness as infinitely minute consciousness. The start is made from those „naked monads", as Leibniz calls them, whose condition is comparable to the condition of a dreamless sleep. When the stage is reached where differentiated organs appear, the organic world arises, and in the psychical life of the animals we have something resembling our own life in dreams. The psychical equivalent of an organ of sense is what is ordinarily called sensation. Sensations are ideas in their primitive and most undifferentiated form; they constitute „the vertigo of the conscious life". Flooded with ideas of everything in the world which has any relation to its body, the animal soul has distinct ideas of nothing. Advance consists not in putting these sensations together—thereby confusion would become more confounded—but in distinguishing them, in getting clearness to emerge out of confusedness, in finding out what they mean. The self-conscious monad, having thus aquired knowledge of necessary truths, can represent the universe with more or less adequacy and distinctness. But, looked at from the point of view of psychical development, rational truths are in the long run percepts developed to the full degree of distinctness and clearness; thinking is perceiving clarified and developed.

Now, although Spinoza did not work out in detail his conception of the different stages of *animata*, it needs little ingenuity to see that he was practically distinguishing the stages which Leibniz describes. Starting with the dictum that all the individual things of nature are living, he was clearly committed to the position that below the level of organic beings there were modes in which

consciousness was present in a dull, crude, weak form. Everything had its soul-side. And in regard to organisms, what Leibniz designates „perception" is coincident with what Spinoza designated „*experientia vaga*" or „imagination", in crude experience, as represented by Spinoza, an enormous number of presentations come pouring in; and „running together", they appear blurred and confused, so that the mind is overwhelmed with the multiplicity of impressions and Images. Modes entirely at the mercy of these would be at the stage of the animal life as it is delineated by Leibniz. Then Spinoza proceeds to trace the way in which from these vague undiscriminated presentations there come to be formed, in human experience, the first primitive universals which serve to guide the actions of ordinary men. The manner of their formation is through the more or less mechanical process of association, and that process varies according to the level of development attained. When, however, the grade of *ratio* is attained, we acquire knowledge of the kind which Leibniz specifies by the term „apperception". „Universal notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things", — ideas which are shared by self-conscious intelligences and which express features common to vast numbers of things—come then to be used. The ideas of imaginative experience are inadequate, — that is to say, partial, fragmentary, incomplete, and therefore, confused and indistinct; the ideas of reason are adequate, — that is to say, contain within themselves the marks of truth, clearness and distinctness, self-sufficiency and consistency of content. Spinoza, as is well known, differentiated yet a further stage which Leibniz hardly does more than hint at, *scientia intuitiva*, „that kind of knowing which proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things".

It is true, there is less explicit recognition by Spinoza than by Leibniz that these stages represent differences of degree only. But I am by no means convinced that Spinoza definitely regarded them as different in kind. Certainly, if he did, it would be difficult to render consistent his account of *scientia intuitiva*. And, on the other hand, it has to be remembered that in one very important respect Leibniz departs from his doctrine of degrees. He finds it hard, he says, to conceive that there is a natural means of raising a sensitive to the rank of a rational soul, and suggests that God has given reason to this soul by a special act, a kind of *transcreation* (*Gerh.* vi, p. 152).

IV. The Relation of Finite Individuals to God. Almost all writers on Spinoza have drawn attention to the wavering in the *Ethics* between two radically inconsistent conceptions of substance, — the one abstract, according to which substance is the blank unity, mere being in general, which is the presupposition of all that seems to be real; the other concrete, according to which substance is the absolute totality of things, regarded, indeed, as in some sense a unity in which particular existences are contained and subordinated. On the one hand, Spinoza is working with the principle that every determination is or involves negation, and that it is only when the fictitious differences introduced by the imagination are eliminated that substance can be truly conceived. „Substance is considered in itself—that is, truly—when we set aside all its modifications (*depositis affectionibus*)". Along this line of reflexion, the notion is reached of the Unconditioned as simply indeterminate being, which can be characterised only by denying of it whatsoever we may assert of the limited and the determinate. So regarded, no predicate can be applied unequivocally to the absolute and to the relative; the former differs from the latter, not only in existence, but also in essence (*Eth.* i, 17 Schol.). The essence of finite beings is privation, want of being; the essence of the infinite is pure being

simply. Evidently from such a bare abstraction, there is no possibility of advance; from pure affirmation merely to the determinations that are necessary in order that substance should be real there is no road. On the other hand, working rather with the principle that each finite thing expresses God in a definite and determinate way, Spinoza conceives of substance as *ens realissimum*, the collective sum of all possible predicates, a being that cannot be exhausted in any one attribute, and containing all perfection and reality. Obviously, these two conceptions are incompatible and cannoth both be combined into a coherent view. The former, the notion of logical ground, yields no explanation of that which constitutes the difference between the logical ground and the particular; a universal can never be contemplated as in its own nature that from which the concrete individual has proceeded. The latter, the notion of *ens realissimum*, yields no means of reaching what Spinoza was desirous of reaching, an ultimate ground to wich the particulars stood in a relation of dependence. The notion of *ens realissimum* has been attained through means of the category of reciprocal determination; and, valuable as this category is in enabling us to systematise the realm of nature, it is inapplicable to the Unconditioned, it has no relevancy when extended beyond the sphere of finite particular things. Viewed either in one way or the other, the notion of substance can in no sense serve as the notion of a matrix from which all determinate differences have arisen, as the notion of the one ultimate being of which everything else is a partial manifestation.

The nature of the difficulty which besets Spinoza's whole way of thinking comes prominently to light in one portion of his work which has not, perhaps, received the attention it deserves. The human mind is treated by him as the sum of those determinate modes of consciousness, ideas, which unite to form an individual subject, just as a group of determinate modes of extension may unite to form an individual physical object through the relation of action and reaction. But now Spinoza recognises that the determinate modes of mind involve at once a relation to modes of the body as their objects and a relation to the subject or the self. „The idea of the mind is united to the mind in the same way as the mind itself is united to the body" (*Eth.* ii, 21). When a man perceives (say) a table or chair, there is (i) a certain mode of consciousness having for its object certain affections of the body of the percipient — the sensations of vision, touch, etc. — and (ii) the idea of that perception, for every mode of consciousness has itself also for its object, or involves the idea of itself. Here, however, the question at once presents itself—is this idea of itself, an idea which appears to be thought of as an aspect of each mode of consciousness, the uniting synthetic act whereby selfconsciousness is constituted? And does the centre of reference lie in the individual mind or does it lie in God? So far as I can judge, Spinoza wishes to locate it in God (*Eth.* ii 21, Schol.), while at the same time he is compelled to allow a species of self-consciousness to the individual mind. Yet, whether the centre of reference be located in God or in the individual mind, it is clear that Spinoza utterly fails to do justice to the peculiar fact involved. Throughout he treats all modes, whether of consciousness or of extension, as though they had to one another only the relations of seperate, isolated parts—as, for example, the parts of extension have, to one another—and hence he naturally looks upon the centre of reference, in this case, as lying external to the elements united. Obviously, however, external relation of that sort is not compatible with the nature of consciousness; and had Spinoza followed out the conception of the human mind as involving a unity, a centre of reference, internal to itself, he must of necessity have been

led to see, on the one hand, that the notion of substance was altogether inadequate to render intelligible what here lay before him; and, on the other hand, that it was not possible to maintain the absolute identity of the universe as consisting of entities which were at once modes of consciousness and modes of extension. For if modes of consciousness are treated after the manner of modes of extension, they are deprived of just that reference to a uniting centre which is essential to their nature, while if such reference be given to them, the conception of whole and part will no longer suffice to cover the relation of the conscious subject to its various states or modes.

In working out his theory of monads, Leibniz made it his aim to rescue philosophy from that destruction of individual existence which seemed to him to be involved in the metaphysic of Spinoza. As against Spinoza, he took his stand upon the position that the individual as such was alone the truly real. But if one scrutinises more closely the conception of individuality, as it was developed by Leibniz, one will soon have reasons for suspecting that the conception will not bear the weight he is wishful to impose upon it. The one characteristic absolutely essential to individuality, as he regards it, is the characteristic of limitation, negation, passivity. Pure unbounded energy or activity seemed, as I have said, to Leibniz incompatible with the notion of real being. Whatever is must be limited. The monad's character is determined by its „point of view"; and that „point of view" is dependent upon the passive, privative, negative element in the monad. In thruth, that which renders the monads mutually impenetrable or exclusive is matter; without the element of materiality they would be absorbed in the being of God, the supreme substance. Now, matter is, in fact, passivity; matter is the correlative of confused ideas. And with the clearing up of knowledge, matter must tend to disappear: just as, according to Spinoza, that which marks off one thing from another tends to disappear as we pass from imagination to rational knowledge. It becomes, however, straightway apparent that if limitation is essential to individuality, then God is not an individual, not a monad in the sense in which a monad had been originally defined.

We are here face to face once more with the two totally distinct ideas of what constitutes real existence[1]), but the point I want now to emphasise is the predicament in which Leibniz is thereby landed when he comes to deal with the relation in which God stands to the world of monads. On the one hand, when Leibniz permits the qualifying terms „necessary" and „contingent" to affect the very nature of the existence qualified, he is led to describe the relation in terms that are practically identical with those of Spinoza. The monads are not to be regarded as distinct from God, nor is it easy to see how they can be regarded as distinct from one another. „Everything", we are told, „is in God, as place is in that which is placed"; and, in a letter to Bayle, the assertion is made that „from the creator of all things, all actual forces or perfections emanate by a sort of continual creation". So, again, in the *Monadology* (§ 47), it is affirmed that „God alone is the primary unity or original substance, of which all created or derivative monads are products, and have their birth, so to speak, through continual fulgurations of the Divinity from moment to moment". Once more, a similar thought receives expression in the *Discours de Métaphysique.* „Created substances depend on God, who conserves them, and even produces them continually by a kind of emanation, as we produce our thoughts". „From God all individuals emanate continually, and he sees the universe not only as they see it, but besides in a very different way from them." These passages, and there are

1) *Supra,* pp. 340—3.

many others to a like effect, might easily have been written by Spinoza himself. On the other hand, when Leibniz is concerned to emphasise the independence of the monad, he is forced to ascribe to the divine being a position of transcendence. The world of monads is metaphysically contingent, he argues; its notion does not involve its existence. It springs from a choice on the part of God. God, therefore, stands to the system of monads in the external relation of cause to effect. That is to say, it is through the very notion of external relation, which had been dismissed as illegitimate when applied to the world of monads, that Leibniz is now compelled to represent the relation between God and the whole system of monads. No ingenuity can help him out of the contradiction into which he has thus fallen. No method is open to him of accommodating within the scope of one and the same view *both* the completeness of God *and* the quasi-independence which is claimed for the world of monads. He appeals, for instance, to the vague principle of the choice of the best, or the tendency of the Divine activity towards perfection. But the difficulties of the situation are rather increased than diminished thereby. For perfection or the good, as Leibniz understands it, is equivalent to the greatest sum of reality, so that God thus becomes once more the *ens realissimum*. Not only is it impossible to effect in this manner a connexion between God and the world of monads, but the notion of God at once begins to fluctuate between that of a totality of positive qualities and that of an indeterminate ground destitute of any distinguishing mark. In short, Spinoza's dilemma reappears again with all its former acuteness. Whichever way be taken, it is impossible for Leibniz to explain, as he desired to do, the limited, passive, negative factor; the conception of the choice of the best avails him not to bring into conjunction the infinite ground and the diversity of finite monads.

It ts worth while, perhaps, referring to another point. The life of the monad, the perceptions or phases of consciousness through which it passes, are the ways in which it expresses the universe. But Leibniz insists upon ascribing to the higher monads the power of forming ideas of the Divine nature, — ideas, that is to say, of that which stands to the monads in a relation very different from the relation in which they stand to one another. He is frequently to be found asserting that the development of each of these monads takes place as though only that monad and God existed. While, then, such monad excludes from itself all influence from the other monads, it is notwithstanding susceptible to influences from God. Yet, how is it possible for the monad thus to transcend its isolation in the one case and to be incapable of doing so in the other? And how are we to reconcile with the finitude and limited character of the monad the possession on its part of ideas of an infinite reality—of a reality, that is, which is not only other than itself but which is other than the whole world of monads? The considerations I am urging are sufficient to show how hopeless it was for Leibniz to preserve such a conception of God as is involved in the two or three passages in which God is described by him as a monad. As *actus purus* without any passivity, God would be what Leibniz once said a monad without matter would be, namely „a deserter from the general order", and how, in that case, He could be in communication with monads who were not deserters is one of the many enigmas Leibniz has left unsolved.

V. Conclusion. The discussion in which we have been engaged is by no means one of merely historical interest. At the present time the questions at issue between Spinoza and Leibniz are reasserting themselves afresh, and in such reference it is not unimportant to inquire how far, as a matter of fact, Leibniz succeeded in surmounting difficulties that Spinoza could not resolve.

When it is asked, for example, „whether finite individuals possess a substantive or an adjectival mode of being", the issue, I take it, is once again being raised whether the finite individual is to be regarded as a „mode" or as, in some sense, at least, a „monad". What it is now customary to call the Absolute retains in essential respects the meaning which Spinoza assigned to Substance, and to a large extent Mr. Bradley's philosophy is the philosophy of Spinoza worked over anew in the light of subsequent science and reflexion. „The positive relation of every appearance as an adjective to Reality, and the presence of Reality among its appearances in different degrees and with diverse values" — this, Mr. Bradley tells us, is the „double truth" which he has found to be the „centre of philosophy". That the position is beset with difficulties has been made evident enough by recent criticism. If, however, any conclusion can be drawn from the comparison I have been instituting, it is most assuredly this, — that there is no way out of those difficulties by the simple device of claiming some special efficacy for the notion of „Activity" or „Life" in conceiving of an ultimate ground of things. When so used, the notion in question loses the significance it possesses as applied to concrete individual existents, and becomes at once infected with all the ambiguity of meaning which attaches to the term Absolute itself. We shall seek in vain to form any intelligible conception of how the Whole of things can be said elther to live or to act.

One consideration alone I will allow myself at the end. Leibniz's fundamental mistake, as I conceive it, lay not in his insisting upon the active character of all finite existences, but in his attempting to exhibit this activity of theirs as a „fulguration" of, or detachment from, one ultimate source of activity. To postulate a source of that description seems to me to be a contradiction in terms. We can form, of course, a general notion of activity, as of other things; but if we suppose that precisely answering to the notion there is an actually existent reality, we are illegitimately hypostasising the said notion and making an entity of an abstraction. Just as there is no such thing as feeling in general but only specific states of feeling, just as there is no such thing as willing in general but only specific processes of willing, so there is no such thing as activity in general but only specific modes of activity. On the other hand, activity, as specifically exercised by particular concrete individuals, does appear to me to be a characteristic so essential that any metaphysical interpretation of them which ignores it is bound to result in failure. Whether, following Leibniz, we are entitled to affirm that everything which exists is active, we need not now stay to inquire; our concern, for the moment, is with some existents that admittedly are active. An individual mind, for example, whatever else it may be, is, at least, a continuous succession of acts or processes of the kind called mental; it is only in and through such acts or processes that there is for it awareness of „connexions of content" at all. To assert, therefore, that all finite individual subjects „are in ultimate analysis connexions of content within the real individual to which they belong"[1]) seems to me tantamount to saying that these finite individual subjects *are* what they are aware of, and to leaving completely out of account the acts or processes of being aware. Doubtless *then* that which alone is peculiar to individuals so regarded—their specific „points of view", namely, — is matter of little or no moment; what is of moment is the connexion of content viewed *sub specie aeternitatis*. Accordingly, the contention that in the Absolute these limited, imperfect, fragmentary „points of view" must be transfermet, transmuted, merged and dissolved becomes explicable; and „because I cannot spread

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1) Bosanquet: *Logic*, 2 ed. vol. ii, p. 258.

out my window until all is transparent, and all windows disappear", I am clearly not justified in insisting on „my window-frame's rigidity[1])." But what vitiates the whole argument is, I submit, the unwarranted assumption made at the start. As an *existing* entity, the finite individual subject *is not* what it is aware of. In its regard, as in regard to other matters of inquiry, it is necessary to distinguish that which is important from that which is fundamental. The „connexions of content" are certainly of supreme importance; they give to a mental life meaning, value and significance. Yet, all the same, its acts or processes, its temporal states and modes of being aware, are for it fundamental; apart from them, it would have no place at all in the realm of existence, let alone a claim to any independence of its own. And I confess I am baffled when I am bidden to conceive of my individuality, in the latter sense, as included within a wider individuality to which I and other finite individuals belong. I do not, that is to say, see in what conceivable way a state or act of my mind can be part of a state or act of an infinite mind, or the latter state or act be „immanent" in my state or act. I can understand what is meant by „immanence" when that term is used with respect to values in their relation to finite consciousnesses; I cannot understand what is meant by it if it has reference to the relation between one existent individual mind and another.

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1) Bradley: *Appearance and Reality*, p. 253.